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On William James’s “Is Life Worth Living?”1 
 
In his piece ‘Is Life Worth Living?’, William James considers what he calls 
“the nightmare or suicidal view of life” (James, 6). On this view, life is not 
worth living because 
   
(1) life could be worth living only if there exists “an unseen order of some 





(2) there exists no such unseen order. 
 
Many philosophers (both before and after James) have rejected (1). That is, they 
have claimed that (what James calls) the “visible” world contains all that is 
required for our lives to be worth living. James, however, finds this response 
unsatisfactory. He says that for life to be worth living it would need to be “a 
real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the Universe by success” 
(James, 23), in which our “bravery and patience...[bear] fruit somewhere in an 
unseen spiritual world” (James, 20). 
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James instead rejects (2). We have reason, he argues, to believe in the 
existence of such an unseen order. He begins by noting that our current science 
is merely 
 
a drop, our ignorance a sea. Whatever else be certain, this at least is certain: 
that the world of our present natural knowledge is enveloped in a larger 
world of some sort of whose residual properties we at present can frame no 
positive idea. (James, 17) 
 
It shows “a lack of scientific imagination”, he says, to think that “all the 
fundamental conceptions of truth have already been found by Science, and that 
the future has only the details of the picture to fill in” (James, 17).  
But why believe that the part of the universe that science has yet to uncover 
includes the sort of unseen order in (1)? James admits that there is (as yet) no 
strong evidence for this claim. (Although: “If needs of ours outrun the visible 
universe, why may not that be a sign that an invisible universe is there?” 
(James, 19)) Instead, he argues, we have a powerful practical reason to believe 
it (or, at least, to try to do so). Namely, if life is a real fight, then it is only if we 
believe that it is, and carry on with a sense of purpose, that we may attain a 
victory in it. In the same way a mountaineer facing a perilous gulf may be able 
to clear it only if he can get himself to believe that he can, so our lives may be 
worth living only if we can get ourselves to believe that they are. 
How should we evaluate James’s response? To start with, we need to 
distinguish between three different senses in which a life may be worth living. 
In the first sense, a life is worth living just in case it is worth living for its 
subject (i.e., this person has more self-interested reason to go on living it than 
to end it now). In the second sense, a life is worth living just in case its subject 
has all-things-considered reason to go on living it (where the relevant reasons 
include, but are not limited to, self-interested ones). In the third sense, a life is 
worth living just in case, when all is said and done, it is good, on balance, that 
its subject existed. 
It may be thought obvious that our lives can be worth living in the first 
sense without an unseen order. But there is room for reasonable disagreement 
here. An unseen order may be necessary for things to be good or bad for us. 
Moreover, even if things can be good or bad for us without an unseen order, it 
may be that we can have reason to do what will benefit us only if it is good that 
we are benefited, and nothing can be good without an unseen order. Indeed, 
many people feel that the inevitability of death (where death is the permanent 
cessation of consciousness) calls into question the value of anything. 
However, I must admit I share the common view that without an unseen 
order things can be good or bad for us, and that it can be good that we are 
benefited. So, I am inclined to believe that without an unseen order our lives 
can be worth living in the first sense. If this is so, then it follows (trivially) that 
without an unseen order our lives can be worth living in the second sense, too. 
But what of the third sense? In this sense, individual lives can be worth 
living without an unseen order, for the obvious reason that it can be good for 
others – and so, good – that one existed. (I assume that it cannot be good for 
oneself that one existed.) But now – and here, I think, is the truth in James’s 
view – without an unseen order, it cannot be true that taken collectively the lives 
of all beings in the visible world are worth living in this third sense. This is 
because our collective existence cannot be good for anybody unless there is 
some unseen order that includes other beings (a god, perhaps, or alternate 
versions of ourselves). (I assume that for something to be good it must be good 
for some being or beings.) 
Is there such an unseen order? James’s piece serves as a useful reminder 
that science is (likely) still only in its infancy, and so it would be premature to 
rule out the existence of such an order. 
Of course, we needn’t accept James’s own view of what this unseen order 
would need to involve (i.e., his appeal to ‘a real fight’). Instead, we can think of 
his piece as an invitation to think more creatively than traditional religions have 
done about how our collective existence might benefit beings who are not of 
this world. 
Note that if there is such a value to our collective existence, then this may 
provide us with further reasons to go on living, and so further reasons why our 
lives are worth living in the second sense. 
A final worry: Could the lives of all beings everywhere (i.e., in the visible 
world and in all other worlds combined) taken collectively be worth living in 
the third sense? If what I have said is right, then no. But this shouldn’t distress 
us. What matters is just that our lives are worth living in the second sense. What 
matters is just that each of us has all-things-considered reason to go on. 
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